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To GumT.-An action was

brought by a guest for injuries alleged due to the defendant's negligent
operation of her automobile. The defendant invited the plaintiff to
ride with her to a distant town, and on the return trip the accident
occurred. Held, judgment for the plaintiff affirmed; it was proper for
the court to instruct the jury that the defendant was under duty to
drive at a reasonable rate of speed, considering condition of the road
at the time and place of the accident. Lally v. Cochran, 231 Ky. 211,
21 S. W. (2nd) 273.
Where the owner of an automobile invites another to ride with
him, the duty of the owner to his guest is to use ordinary care not to
increase -the danger of the guest or to create any new danger. Beard
v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W. 319. "A person invited to ride in
an automobile is a licensee and the duty of the person extending such
invitation is to use 'ordinary care' not to increase the danger of the
guest or to create a new danger." Berry, on Automobiles. See also
Pigeon v. Lane, 80 Conn. 888; Mayberry v. Sivey. 18 Kan. 291; Hem.ington v. Hemington, 221 Mich. 206, 190 N. W. 683; and Gr. Southern
Lumber Co. v. Hamilton, 137 Miss. 55, 101 So. 787.
In Georgia and Massachusetts it has been held that the owner is
liable to a guest riding gratuitously only for gross negligence. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168; and Epps v. Parish,26 Ga.
App.. 299, 116 S. E. 297.
Among the problems arising from such cases as the one at bar is
that of the duty owed by the owner or driver of an automobile to a
guest at sufferance, or to one whom such driver has consented to carry
on request to do so, as contrasted with his duty to a guest of his own
invitation.
A person carried for his accommodation is a licensee, to whom
the owner owes the duty not to injure wantonly or intentionally.
Crider v. Y. Coal, etc., Co., 206 Ala. 71, 89 So. 285; and Rose v. Squires,
(N. J.) 128 AtL. 888 (1925). So we see that the guest is termed a licensee in such cases regardless of his solicitation for the ride, but some
jurisdictions make a distinction as to the duty owed by the driver or
owner to such licensee. On the other hand the distinction has met
considerable opposition, as in Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195
N. W. 855, where the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly declined "to
recognize any such possible distinction as is spoken of in several
decisions between the guest'who asks for the favor and the guest who
is first invited by the host." Also Munson v. Ruphser (Ind. App.), 148
N. E. 169, 28 Mich. L. R. 57 (Nov., 1929).
Another question which may arise in cases similar to the one at
bar is whether the protectioh. of the court shall be given to the Injured
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guest where he and the nominal defendant are in accord against the
defendant's insurer? It is held that where the plaintiff is a joint
adventurer then the defendant is acting as his agent and his negligence
is imputed to the plaintiff or the risk is assumed. Krueger v. Krueger,
222 N. W. 784 (Wis.). Along this line of decision the defense of contributory negligence is adopted to defeat claims against insurance comA. J. A.
panies.
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AcTs PRIOR TO PURCHASE OF STOoK-Plaintiff purchased stock in the
defendant corporation in 1926. He subsequently brought action
against the corporation and others, alleging that in 1921 and 1922 a
director of C. D. Corporation fraudulently deprived preferred stockholders of large sums .of money. Held: As plaintiff did not acquire
his preferred stock until year 1926, he could not sue for himself or for
those who were preferred stockholders in 1921 and 1922, as he was not
a fair representative of the class affected. Neff v. Gas and Elect. Shop,
22 S. W. (2nd) 265, Part 4.
This deciison is directly in line with the federal courts on this
proposition, as they uniformly hold that a stockholder cannot sue to
set aside or enjoin an ultra vires transaction or redress a misappropriation of corporate assets, or to enjoin or obtain release for fraud
or negligence on the parr of the director or other shareholder, unless
he was a stockholder at the time of the transaction complained of or
his shares have devolved upon him since by operation of law. Foote
v. Cunard Min. Co., 5 McCray 251, 17 Fed. 46; Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U. S. 461, 26 U. S. (L. ed.) 827; Dinfell v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 110 U. S.
209, 28 U. S. (L. ed.) 121; Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U. S. 489, 32 U. S.
(L. ed.) 179. The same rule has been asserted in a few states upon
the authority of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Alexander v. Hearsey, 8 S. E. (Ga.) 630; Boldenweclc v. Bullin,
90 Pac. (Colo.) 634; Clark v. American Coal Go., 53 N. W. (Iowa) 291;
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 93 N. W. (Neb.) 1024.
The decisions in the federal courts are not based upon any general
principle, but upon Equity Rule 94 (New Equity Rule 27), which was
adopted only for purpose of guarding against collusion of parties for
the purpose of bringing cases within jurisdiction of federal courts.
Merely a rule of practice.
By the weight of authority, in the absence of such a rule of practice, a stockholder is not precluded from suing on behalf of himself
and other stockholders by the mere fact that he purchased his shares
after the transaction complained of, even though he may have made
the purchase for the purpose of acquiring a standing to sue, provided
neither he nor his transferror is otherwise estopped. See Ballentine,
Private Corporations, pages 624, 625, 629, 630; 7 R. C. L. see. 294; note
vol. 25 Ann. Cas. 1912D at page 1102; Just v. Idaho Canal, etc., Go.,
102 Pac. (Idaho) 381; Parsons v. Joseph, 8 So. (Ala) 788; Erny v. G.
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TV. Schmidt Co., 47 Atl. (Pa.) 877; Appleton v. American Malting Co.,
54 AtI. (N. J. Eq.) 375; Chicago v. Camer6n, 22 Ill. App. 104. Practically all English courts are in accord with this view. See 21 H. L. R.
197. Machen in his work on the Modern Law of Corporations, sec. 1169,
states that "The general rule is that a shareholder is not debarred from
suing because he purchased his shares after the transaction complained
of, and even for the purpose of qualifying himself to bring the suit."
Stated further, "that the foregoing principles with regard to the law
generally are modified as to suits in the federal courts by a rule of
practice in equity promulgated by the Supreme Court under statutory
authority."
Causes of action belonging to the corporation increase the value
of the corporate estate and must be treated like any other assets,
according to Morawetz on Private Corporations (2nd ed.), vol. 1, page
25S, and when enforced they inure to the benefit of all the shareholders
without distinction. It is plain, therefore, that a shareholder has an
interest in all causes of action belonging to the corporation, whether
they arose before or after he purchased his shares.
It seems rather unfortunate that the Court of Appeals in the principal case has given its approval to a rule which is clearly in disfavor
among a majority of the courts and text-writers.
W. B. G.
EviDrca-PELmnxmAnY QuEsTiONs-How DEcDED.-The defendant
was arrested for operating an automobile in the night time without
lights. Upon arrest, the arresting officer noticed several gallons of
moonshine whiskey in the car. The defendant was indicted for the
illegal possession of intoxicating liquor and at the trial, there having
been much conflict and contradiction in the evidence on the question
of the operation of the machine without lights, and hence much question of the officer's right to arrest, the defdndant objected to the admission of the testimony of the arresting officer as to the whiskey. Held,
that the officer's evidence relative to seeing the whiskey when he
arrested the defendant, should have been admitted, but the jury should
have been instructed to acquit the defendant, unless they should, from
the evidence, believe that the defendant was operating this automobile
without lights turned on. Morris v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 838, 22
S. W. (2nd) 295.
The broad general rule that preliminary questions of fact are for
the judge is no longer questioned. But when the preliminary question
is of such importance that it is equal to and decisive of the main issue,
as in the principal case, the authorities are divided. Some courts allow
the question of admissibility to go to the jury with instructions to disregard altogether the evidence if it is proved inadmissible. Respublica,
v. Hevice, 3 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 505 (Pa.); Stowe v. Querner, L. IL 5
Exch. 155; Billings v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 381, 3 S. W. (2nd) 770.
Other courts 'hold that in such circumstances the judge should pass
upon the preliminary question. Hichins v. Rardley, L. R. 2, P. and D.
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248; Sftate v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356; Laird v. State, 184 S. W. 810
(Tex.).
Proponents of -the first rule above say the later rule would amount
to a practical deprivation of the defendant's rights to a trial by jury.
There is some weight to this argument, but it melts away in light of
the fact that the ultimate decision rests with the jury, who have the
power of disregarding the admitted evidence. Serious objections are
pointed out in (40 Harv. L. Rev. 392) in an article by Professor
Maguire and Professor Epstein of the Harvard Law School, to allowing
the jury to decide all preliminary questions (Wigmore, 2nd Ed., sec.
2550). While the rule in'the principal case seems to be unquestionably
the law in Kentucky, it is submitted that, in order to avoid these
patent dangers, it should be strictly limited and confined to cases
(1) where there is only one preliminary question of fact; (2) where
such fact is determinative of the case, and (3) where a reasonable man
M. P. W.
could decide the case either way.
INFANTS-ESTOPPEL

To
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automobile from defendant and defendant took D's old automobile in
as part payment and his notes payable monthly for the balance. D paid
three of the notes but did not pay the last two, whereupon the defendant took the automobile from D. D sued through his next friend for
the return of the old car and the amount of the three notes. Defendant
contended that since D falsely represented to it that he was twenty-one
he should be estopped to disaffirm the contract. Held, the circumstances were not sufficient to bring the case under the rule of estoppel
which is applied by the Kentucky courts where infants falsely represent or fraudulently conceal their correct age. Pinnacle Motor Co. v.
Daughterty, 231 Ky. 626, 21 S. W. (2nd) 1001.
It is a well recognized rule that a minor who makes a contract
may disaffirm it on arriving at the age of majority. No question as to
such a disaffirmance can be raised where the other contracting party
knew of his minority at the time of the making of the contract. In
Kentucky as set forth in the dicta of the instant case it is the rule that
a fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of age which has misled
the other party will thereafter estop the infant from avoiding the contract. Damron v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 268, 61 S. W. 459; Asher v.
Bennett, 143 Ky. 361, 136 S. W. 879; County Board of EVucation v. Hensley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S. W. 63. The court, however, will not hold in all
cases that, if an infant testified that he was twenty-one, the party who
dealt with him by reason of that fact will be protected. The rule
properly stated is: "that personal appearance, family -surroundings,
and business activities coupled with a misrepresentation or fraudulent
concealment by the infant leading one who deals with him in good
faith and not knowing of his infancy to believe he is of age, will estop
him from thereafter maintaining an action to avoid an executed contract." Young v. Daniel, 201 Ky. 65, 255 S. W. 854. Kentucky makes
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no distinction between executed and partly executed contracts. Some
jurisdictions do. See 14 Kentucky Law JQurnal 258. The facts of the
instant case failed to warrant the application of the above rule. It
was, however, expressly stated verbatim in the body of the case. The
rule applies equally to false representations and fraudulent concealmints. The rule is only an application of the equitable doctrine that
he who misleads another will not be allowed to assert the contrary
thereby perpetrating a fraud upon him. Such a principle is applied
only when necessary to protect a grantee from a fraud. Asher v. Bennett, supra; Bailey v. Barnberger,11 B. M. (Ky.) 113; Ingram v. Ison,

26 Ky. L. R. 48.
The courts are not agreed upon the principle under discussion, but
it seems that the weight of authority is decidedly against the Kentucky
rule of estoppel. The weight of authority allows a disaffirmance even
though the infant frauduleiltly misrepresented or concealed his age.
Merriam v. Unninghan, 11 Cushing (Mass.) 40; Conore v. Birldsa77,
1 Johns. (N. Y.) 127; Geer v. Hovey, 1 Root (Conn.) 179 (1790); Utterstrai v. Kidder, 124 le. 10, 124 A. 725; Creer v. Active Auto. Exch.,
99 Conn. 266, 121 A. 888; Godfrey v. Mutual Finance Corp., 242 Mass.
197, 136 N. E. 178.
The United States Supreme Court and the Federal Courts have
adopted the majority view. Sins v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300, and Rice
Auto Co., 280 F. 452, respectively, clearly illustrate the above. The
English court long ago adopted the rule as followed by the Kentucky
court. Co. v. Gertchen, 2 Madd. Ch. 40, 56 Eng. Rep. 250; Wright v.
gnowe, 2 De G. & S. 321, 64 Eng. Rep. 144.
Some states have enacted statutes providing that infants shall
not be allowed to disaffirm contracts which they have induced by a
fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of their age. Dillon. v.
Burnham, .43 Kan. 77, 22 P. 1016; Prouty v. Edgar, 6 Ia. 353; Lee v.
Hibernia Sav. & L. Hoc.. 177 Cal. 656, 171 P. 677.
It seems to the writer that the Kentucky view is more logical and
just than the majority. How can it be said that infants are privileged
to practice frauds upon innocent parties with whom they deal? Lord
Mansfield in Abbott v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, 97 Eng. Rep. 1103, and
Judge Miller in The County Board of Education v. Hensley, supra,
stated the strongest argument for the minority rule and against the
majority rule when they said: "The privilege of infancy is a shield for
the protection of the infant, and not a weapon of attack; nor is it to
be used as a means of defrauding others." It seems that this is sounder
than the argument in Sims v. Everhardt, supra, whdre' it was said:
"An estoppel in pals is not applicable to infants, and a fraudulent
representation of capacity cannot be an equivalent for actual capacity."
W. C. W.
JUDGMENT-PROrES PARTIES To AcTiox ON AssIa' mNT or JuDGiEnT.-The assignee of a judgment sued in his own name to recover
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on the same. Held, in an action of this kind by the assignee, who is
the real owner of the chose, the assignor must be made a party. Shaw,
v. McRnight-Keaton Grocery Co., 231 Ky. 223, 21 S. W. (2nd) 269.
The court in handing down the decision in the present case
unquestionably followed the settled Kentucky .rule, as shown by
several cases directly in point. Elliott v. Waring, 5 T. B. Mon (Ky.)
338, 17 Am. Dec. 69; Allen v. Crockett and Patton, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 240;
Young v. Bodes, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 500; Lytre v. Lytle, 2 Mete. (Ky.)
127. The case of Allen v. Crockett and Patton, supra, decided in 1815,
seems to show, however, that section 19 of the Civil Code of Practice
is not a formulation of a new rule but merely a restatement of the law
as it existed before the code. In that case the court said, "As the obligation was not assignable by law, it is plain that the assignors were
necessary parties to a suit brought for the purpose of enforcing its
execution. The rule recognized by this decision is not one recently
recognized by the court. On the contrary, it is as old as the institution of the Court of Chancery, and the principles upon which it is
founded is consonant to the dictates of common sense and coeval with
reason itself."
The common law rule based on the doctrine that the assignment
of a judgment does not pass a legal title, fully accords with the Kentucky decisions. Sharp v. Moore, 3 N. J. L. 844; Heard v. Turner, 234
Mass. 526, 125 N. E. 596; Adams v. Connelly, 118 Ill. A. 441; Moore v.
Ireland, 1 Ind. 531; Wolffe v. Ederlein,74 Ala. 99, 49 Am. R. 809; Robinson v. Echly, 6 Ga. 515; Sweet Springs Chemical Bank v. Buckley, 68
Mo. A. 327. At the present time, however, the common law rule has
been abrogated by statute in almost all of the states, so that by a
decided weight of authority the assignee of a judgment can now sue
thereon in his own name and without joining that of his assignor.
Moore v. Nowell, 94 N. C. 265; Bamberger v. American Surety Company, 48 Misc. 221, 96 N. Y. Supp. 665; Weir v. Davenport, 11 Iowa 49,
77 Am. Dec. 132; Walburn v. Chenault, 31 Fla. 45, 12 S. 536; Hamilton
v. New Haven, 82 Conn. 208, 73 Atl. 1; Curtin v. Kowalsky, 145 Cal. 431,
78 P. 962. This rule works no hardship against the judgment debtor,
since the assignee of such judgment takes it subject to all the defenses
which the judgment debtor might have had against the original
assignor. Parkerv. Reid, 273 P. 334.
It is submitted that the ruling of the present case is wrong on
principle since it tends to encumber the record, slow down legal procedure by bringing in third parties, and in case of failure to maintain
the action on the judgment, the assignor, who has been made a party
to the suit, may be made liable for a portion of the costs. The modern
rule allows a more simple and speedy recovery and at the same time
allows the judgment debtor the same defenses he would have had as
against the original assignor. The remedy is an amendment to the
so-called "real party in interest" section of the code, which is certainly
E. E. A.
misnamed In Kentucky.
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SIONED BY A HOLE 1n THE SmEwALi.-Plaintiff stepped into what she
designated a "rough, rugged hole" in a sidewalk while she was exercising ordinary care for her own safety, with the result that she was
painfully injured. She brought an action against the owner of the
abutting lot, the tenant of the property, and the oil company which
installed and removed the gasoline pump. The court held that since
the landlord received no benefit from the pump, and a landlord is not
generally liable for the negligence of the tenant in the use of the premises, and the further fact that the property owner is ordinarily under
no duty to repair a sidewalk adjoining his property, that plaintiff could
not recover. J. E. M. Milling Compa-y v. Gaines, 231 Ky. 779, 22 S. W.
(2nd) 274.
To recover on account of a defective sidewalk these elemental facts
must be established: First, that while using the sidewalk properly the
injuiy was suffered by reason of the defect; second, that the sidewalk
was not reasonably safe on account of the defect, with specifications;
third, that the defect ,had existed a sufficient length of time for the
municipal corporation, in the exercise of a reasonable care, to have
known of its existence in time to have repaired it had reasonable diligence been exercised. Barnes v. St. Joseph, 151 Mo. App. 523, 528, 132
S. W. 318.
Ordinarily, a property owner is under no duty to repair a sidewalk
adjoining his property. Newport v. Schmit, 231 S. W. 54. So also the
occupant is not liable for defects in a sidewalk which he did not create
nor for failure to repair a sidewalk if he did not cause the necessity
therefor. City of Newport v. Schmit, 231 S. W. 54, 191 Ky. 585. The
fact that the defect or obstruction in a street is the result of an act
of a third person, other than employees of the municipality, does not
relieve the municipality from liability therefor. Colburn v. Wilmington, 4 Penn. (Del.) 443, 56 Atl. 605. Where the defect is caused by a
third person, the negligence for which the municipality is liable is not
the creation of the defect but instead the negligence in failing to
remove the, defect after actual or constructive notice thereof. Brown
v. Louisbrg, 126 N. C. 701, 36 S. E. 166, 78-Am. St. Rep. 677.
Whether the defect in question is of such character that the municipality is negligent in permitting it to continue is always a question
for the jury to determine in the light of all the circumstances of the
case. -Welsh v. City of Des Moines, 170 N. W. 369. Ordinarily, the
city is not liable for small breaks in the sidewalk as it is not an insurer
of the personal safety of everyone who uses its public walks. It owes
no duty to keep them in such repair that accident cannot possibly
occur. Gross v. Seattle, 100 Wash. 542, 171 Pac. 533.
Even where the sidewalk is used for some unlawful purpose or a
permit is not obtained, the city is not released from its obligation.
Boyle v. Hazleton, 171 Pa. 167, 33 Atl. 142. In some states, where the
act of changing the sidewalk is entirely proper and but for the negli-
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gence of the person making the change no injury could result, the
municipality is not liable. Von Longerke v. X. Y., 134 N. Y. S. 832,
837, 150 App. Div. 98, 103.
The duty of the municipality to use ordinary care to keep the
streets and sidewalks reasonably safe for the customary uses inures
to the benefit of every person lawfully using the streets, Powers v.
Boston, 154 Mass. 60, 27 N. E. 995, and even a child has a right of action
for injury sustained because of a defect in the sidewalk. Townley v.
Huntington, 68 W. Va. 574, 70 S. E. 368.
The law is fairly well settled that it is the duty of the municipality
to exercise reasonable care to keep its sidewalks and footways in a
reasonably safe condition for the passage of the public, Goodwyn v.
Shreveport, 134 La. 820, 64 So. 762, and a pedestrian on a sidewalk
within the limits of a municipal corporation has 'a right to assume
that it is safe for travel. City of Louisville v. Vaughn, 203 S. W. 546.
C. E. B.
OIcua-FoRcu AILOWABLE iN RECAPTURMG PERSON FOR MISDu=Axon WHo MERELY FLEEs.-The appellant committed a misdemeanor
in the presence of a police officer and then fled. The officer pursued
and opened fire on appellant with his gun, and appellant in return
fired on the officer, killing him. He was charged with murder. Held,
that the officer had the right only to pursue appellant for the purpose
of arresting or recapturing him, but that he had no right to shoot at
or otherwise imperil the life or limb of appellant, and that if he did
so, the latter had the right to defend himself in the exercise of his
ordinary right of self-defense. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky.
159, 22 S. W. (2nd) 599.
Beyond section 43 of the Criminal Code, which provides that no
unnecesairy violence shall be used, the statute is silent as to the force
allowable to an officer making an arrest. Under the Common Law in
the case of a misdemeanor, it was not lawful to kill the party accused
if he fled from arrest, though he could not otherwise be overtaken,
and though there was a warrant for his arrest. 2 Hale Pleas of the
Crown, 302. Unless the offender resisted to such an extent as to place
the officer in danger of his life or great bodily harm, the latter could
not kill him. Human life is too sacred to admit of a more severe rule.
Stevens v. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 32. As stated by Brown, J., in U. S.
v. Clark, 31 Federal 713, "the general rule is well settled by elementary
writers upon criminal law, that an officer having custody of a person
charged with felony may take his life, if it becomes absolutely necessary to do so to prevent his escape; but he may not do this if he is
charged simply with a misdemeanor; the theory of the law being that
it is better that a misdemeanant escape than that human life be
taken." However, as is suggested in the case of Head v. Martin, 85
Ky. 483, the law need not go unenforced-the officer may summon a
posse and take the prisoner.
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It is also held that an officer cannot kill to prevent the escape of
one in custody for a misdemeanor, as this is virtually a rearrest.
Reneau v. State, 2 Lea, 720; Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 483; Thomas v.
Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502. The rule is otherwise where the attempted
escape is made a felony by statue. State v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642.
A case most directly in point with the instant case was that of
Hardin v. State, 40 Texas Cr. Reports, 208. It was held that where
the accused was not resisting an officer attempting to arrest him for
a misdemeanor, but was attempting to escape, the officer had no right
to kill him; and if he drew his pistol, and shot at the accused to kill
him to prevent his escape, the right of self-defense would be complete.
It is the general rule, therefore, that in misdemeanor cases, where
a person sought to be arrested does not assault the officer and forcibly
resist the attempt to arrest, but flees, the officer cannot kill him in
pursuit, but must rather suffer him to escape. Clark Crim. Prac., p.
52; Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 483; Thomas v. Kinkead, 502; State v.
Moore, 39 Conn. 244. The only recourse left for the officer to effect
the arrest of a fleeing misdemeanant is for him to either overtake the
offender and use such physical force as is necessary to restrain him or
to call a posse to assist him to do so.
J. K. L.
PLADixG-NEGATIVE PBEGAiT.-A borrowed money from the plaintiff and executed therefor his promissory note. A died and after his
death the defendant, his widow and executrix, renewed the note several times. At the last renewal she executed a note which she signed
both as Executrix and in her individual capacity. The plaintiff filed
suit to recover the amount of this note. In the first paragraph of the
defendant's answer, she denied the execution of the renewal note sued
on, or that she signed her name thereto as surety "except as and under
and by reason of the circumstances and facts hereinafter set out." In
subsequent paragraphs she alleged certain facts and circumstances by
way of defense. The plaintiff demurred to the first paragraph of the
answer. Held, that answer denying execution of the renewal note sued
on "except as and under and by reason of the circumstances and facts
hereinafter set out," was a negative pregnant, admitting in effect the
execution of the note and therefore bad on demurrer. Citizens National
Bank v. Dodson, 23 S. W. (2nd) 1019.
While the Court holds this to be negative pregnant, it was probably intended to be in the nature of a confession and a voidance,
if the, entire answer is considered, but the first paragraph containing
nothing but the express admission, though in negative form, is worthless. The court cited the case of Boececley v. Central Having Bank &
Trust Co., 205 Ky. 508; 266 S. W. 15, which is directly in point and in
which Chief Justice Sampson laid down verbatim the rule of this case,
and which is direct authority for holding this type of denial a negative
pregnant
In Stephen on Pleading, 380, it is said: "A negative pregnant Is
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such a form of negative expression as may imply or carry with it an
affirmative." Obviously a traverse concluding with "except as hereinafter stated," falls within the definition. The law refuses the pleading of negative pregnant because "it does inveigle and does not settle"
or bring to issue a particular point-Lord Hobart in State v. Drake,
Hob. 295. That ambiguity is the fault with negative pregnant seems
to be fundamental. Stephen on Pleading, 419; Thurman v. Wild, 11
A. & E. 453; P. & D. 289; G-wynne v. Burnell, 6 Bing N. C. 530.
The argument has also been advanced that a negative pregnant
could not be tolerated in a jurisdiction where pleadings are required
to be verified because no one could be convicted of perjury for such a
denial, because it is uncertain what he intended to deny. White V.
East Side Mill Co., 81 Ore. 107, 158 Pac. 173, 527.
A very small minority of jurisdictions do not recognize the doctrine of such strict and literal construction of pleadings as result in
finding negative pregnant. Cooper v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 139 Mo. App.
570, 123 S. W. 497; Wynn v. Cory, 43 Mo. 301; and under Code provisions
In O'Brien v. Seattle Ice Co., 43 Wash. 217, 86 Pac. 399, where intention
to deny is apparent; Clark on Code Pleading, 399.
However, see
Breckinridge v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 87 Mo. 62, and Emory v. Phillips,
22 Mo. 499, two Missouri cases which are decided on grounds of negative
pregnant.
Negative pregnant generally arises from a too literal denial of the
allegations of the declaration. Clark on Code Pleading, 399; Welch v.
Bigger, 24 Idaho 169, 133 Pac. 381; Campbell v. Daniell, 68 Fla. 282,
67 So. 90; Gahren, Dodge d Maltby v. Farmers Bank of Estill County,
156 Ky. 717; 161 S. W. 1127. The denial in the answer in the instant
case however, is equally pregnant with the admission of the fact that
it purports to deny.
Where it clearly appears from other parts of the answer that
allegations technically admitted by negative pregnant, are in fact
denied, the answer will be held good. Hershey v. O'Neill, 36 Fed. 168;
Kennedy v. Dickie, 27 Mont. 70, 69 Pac. 672. For this reason, as a
general denial puts in issue every allegation of the complaint there
can be no negative pregnant in suc] a case. GermanAmerican Bank v.
White, 38 Minn. 471, 38 N. W. 361; Thompson v. Erie R. Co., 45 N. Y.
468. Obviously therefore negatives pregnant have become less frequent
under modern Code Pleading in jurisdictions permitting the general
traverse. This problem does not arise in Kentucky however, because
the general traverse is not allowed. Carroll Civil Code, Sec. 126.
The whole idea back of the negative pregnant doctrine is not in
harmony with the spirit of modern Code Pleading, but is a survival
of the days when the rules of the contest were more important. than
judgments on substantive rights. O'Brien v. Seattle Ice Co., supra; Wan
v. Buffalo Water Works Co. 18 N. Y. 119; Clark on Code Pleading 399.
In Kentucky the general denial not being permitted, the practice
of denying in the words of the complaint has become standard as the
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substitute therefor. Under this practice negative pregnants under a
strict construction would flourish, but the Courts for expedience are
getting away from the old strict construction and taking a more
liberal view of pleadings.
R. 14. G.
STATUTE OF FRaUDS-ORAL AGREmENT

TO DEVISE---RECOVERY

OF

VALuE OF Suawcm.-The plaintiff entered into an oral agreement with

the testator that the plaintiff would run the testator's show in
Mississippi and send all the net proceeds to the testator, who lived in
Paducah. The testator was to invest the money in real estate and was
to devise the same to the plaintiff. The plaintiff conducted the show
for several years according to the agreement, but the testator in his
will made other disposition of the property. Held, that the plaintiff
Is not entitled to real estate, but is entitled to damages to the amount
of the value of his services. Haralambo'sExecutor v. Christopher, 231
Ky. 550, 21 S. W. (2nd) 983.
Kentucky Statues Section 470 provides that no action shall be
brought to charge any person upon any contract for the sale of real
estate unless the contract or some memorandum or note thereof be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged. A parol agreement to
devise land has been uniformly held to be within this section of the
Statute in this State. Drake v. Crump, 185 Ky. 325, 215 S. W. 41;
Bobbitt v. James, 148 Ky. 244, 146 S. W. 431; Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233,
154 S. W. 900, all cited by the Court. See also Waters v. Cline, 121 Ky.
611, 85 S. W. 209; McDanieZ v. Hutckerson, 136 Ky. 412, 124 S. W. 384.
Benge v. Hiatt, 82 Ky. 666, 56 Am. Rep. 912; Notes to 14 L. R. A. 362.
In Oregon it has been held that an agreement to devise is not an
agreement for the sale of land, and therefore not under the rule of the
Statute. Woods v. Dunn, 81 Ore. 457, 159 Pac. 1158. This is the
decided minority view, but is followed in Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb.
591, 134 S. W. 185; and Turnipseeav. Sirrine, 57 S. C. 559, 35 S. E. 757.
In the South Carolina case no real estate was involved, so it is not
directly in point. Similarly in Kentucky an agreement to leave a
legacy is not within the Statute of Frauds. Sturgeon's Admr. v.
McCorkle, 163 Ky. 8, 173 S. W. 149; King v. Hanna, 48 Ky. 369; Chitty
on Contracts, 68 note 2.
That the promisee, however, can sue for the value of his services
is unquestionably the rule in this Commonwealth. Bottitt v. James,
supra; Speers v. Sewell, 67 Ky. 239; Myles' Executor v. Miles, 69 Ky.
237, cited by the Court; also Berry v. Graddy, 58 Ky. 553; Doty's Admr.
v. Doty's Guardian, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 63; Gates v. Davis, 28 Ky. L. Rep.
490, 89 S. W. 490.
The promise to pay is implied not only from the performance on
the part of the promisee, but also from the benefits which have accrued
to the promisor. For this reason, where there has been such performance, but the promisor has received no benefits, the action on a quantum
meruit will not lie. Fabian v. Wasatk Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 125
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Pac. 860, 862, L. R. 1. 1916D 892; Cook v. Doggett, 2 Allen (Mass.)
439; Banker v. Henderson, 58 N. J. L. 26, 32 Atl. 700.
It appears from the proof in this case that the promisee deducted
his pay from the net earnings of the business before he sent the money
to the promisor. This being true it is submitted that the promisee
having already received pay for his services cannot recover again on
R. M. 0.
quantum meruit.
STATUTE OF FRAUDs-NEcEssrrY OF PLFniG.-Action for specific
performance of an alleged contract for the purchase of land. There were
two written proposals to purchase put in evidence, but no written
acceptance was made to plaintiff on such. Parol evidence 'as admitted
showing acceptance of the second proposal. The question is whether
the second proposal constituted an enforceable contract? Held, petition
dismissed. Although the Statute of Frauds is not expressly pleaded,
it is a rule in this state that a defendant may take advantage of the
statute, not only by demurrer to a petition which shows a parol contract, but by a general denial of the contract made in response.
Nugent v. Humpich et al., 231 Ky. 122, 21 S. W. (2nd) 153.
Where plaintiff pleads an oral contract within the statute of frauds,
the defendant may obtain the benefit of the statute under a general
denial of the contract. Johnson v. Broughton, 183 Ky. 628, 210 S. W.
455. Also C. & H. R. Co. v. Posey, 196 Ky. 379, 244 S. W. 770. "Defense
of statute of frauds, though not pleaded, is available to the defendant
under plea denying making of the contract." Sussex Inv. Co. v. Clendaniel, 129 Atl. 919 (Del. Chan.); Cook v. Cave, 260 S. W. 49, 163 Ark.
407; Degheri v. Carbine, 135 Atl. 518 (N. J. Ch.).
On consideration of the question at bar, it is found that although
there appear to be many differences in the various jurisdictions as to
when the Statute of Frauds must be pleaded in. order to be available
as a defense, yet there is a decided tendency toward a more lenient
requirement.
It is seen that in a great many jurisdictions only a few years past
the defense of the statute of frauds was required to be specially pleaded
In order to be available. Tolleson v. Henson, 93 So. 458, 207 Ala. 529.
The statute could not even be raised by demurrer. However, in other
cases We see a getting away from this strict rule, and the defense of
the statute is allowed by demurrer where the petition affirmatively
shows that the contract sued on is oral. Kinney v. Kinney, 93 S. E.
496, 20 Go. App. 816.
However, there are a few jurisdictions that still require that the
statute must be strictly pleaded in order to be available as a defense,
as is seen in the more recent cases of Clayton v. Lemen, 233 Ill. 435;
and Christopher v. Davis, 284 S. W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.).
Upon the question of raising the defense of the statute of frauds
by a demurrer the general rule and the decided weight of authority
may be stated, that when it appears from the declaration, or bill, that
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the representations alleged are oral, when by statute of frauds they
must be in writing, demurrer will lie. Bank of Conm. & Tr. Co. v.
Schooner, 160 N. E. 790 (Mass.); Barnsdafl v. Dykes, 26 Fed. (2nd) 696
(Okla.).
As to the possibility of raising the defense of the statute of frauds
by general denial of the contract there appears to be no unanimity of
decisions, yet the tendency is in the direction of allowing the statute
as a defense being raised in this manner. This contention is sustained
in the case of Healy v. O'bear, 157 Pac. 570, 29 CaL App. 696, wherein
it was decided that "one seeking the protection of the Statute of Frauds
against the enforcement of a contract need not specially insist upon
the statute in his pleadings further than to deny the execution of the
contract." Also in Stanford v. Sager, 217 S. W. 458, 141 Ark. 458.
A. J. A.
TonTs-PRox1mTn CAusE-"BuT Foe'l RuLn-Plaintiff was injured
in a train wreck which was caused by the train running into the switch
which had been opened by would-be robbers. It was contended that
d~fendant railway company was negligent, and the court in its decision
sanctioned the following rule: If the injury is the result of concurring
causes, one for which the defendant is responsible--the one guilty of
the negligence will be held liable for the consequences if the injury
could have been reasonably anticipated and the injury would not have
happened but for his negligence; that is, if his negligence was the
proximate cause. Riley v. The L. & X1. Railway Co., 231 Ky. 564, 21
S. W. (2nd) 990.
The rule in the above case raises the question of the "but for"
causa sine qua non test of proximate cause. if the following elements
are present, negligence on the part of the defendant, accident, or criminal act of another, or act of God together with the fact that they could
have been anticipated in the light of the attending circumstances, the
courts of this state adopt the "but for" test of proximate cause and
consequent liability. City of Louisville v. Bridwell, 150 Ky. 589, 150
S. W. 672; Cohen d ftryck v. Home Telephone Co., 179 Ky. 107, 200
S. W. 344; L. d X. v. O'Brien, 163 Ky. 538, 174 S. W. 31. The rule has a
substantial following in other states. IKenney v. Kansas City P. & G. R.
Co., 74 Mo. App. 310; Chicago B.
Q. Ry. v. Shaffer, 26 Ill. App. 2S0;
Prederick v. Hale, 42 Mon. 153, 11T P. 70; Brown v. West River Side
Coal Co., 143 Iowa 662, 120 N. W. 732; Mo. K. d T. By. Co. v. Johnson,
34 0kla. 582, 126 P. 567. The rule is based upon the idea that the act
of God, accident, or criminal act was a condition which it was the duty
of the defendant to foresee and guard against.
The "but for" requirement is generally one of the elements necessary to make out legal cause, but it is not the only requisite element;
It is not per se an all-sufficient element. The fact that the damage
would not have happened but for the commission of the defendant's
tort does not invariably justify the conclusion that the tort was the
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legal cause of the injury in the legal sense of damages. Jerimia.
Smith, Legal Cause, 25 H. L. IL 103 at 109. If the "but for which"
statement is turned around and put in the negative form it can usually
be applied as a test of what is not the cause of an event; that is, defendant would not be liable if the accident would have happened anyway.
Sowlers v. Moore, 65 Vt. 322, 26 A. 629. Stated affirmatively it is erroneous when taken alone. That one event would not have happened
but for the happening of some other event goes somewhat to establishing a relation between the two as to cause and effect, but no rule as
to remoteness can be based on that circumstance alone; for the same
thing may be true as to many other antecedent events. G4ma2 v.
K. F.
Noyes, 57 N. H. 627,
TusTs--CoNTRoL oF TaUSrus'S DisoncnoN-The testator, father
of the plaintiff, created a spendthrift trust providing that in case the
beneficiary sold, conveyed, or encumbered his interest in real estate,
it would thereupon vest in his children. The wife of the beneficiary
procured a divorce and judgment for alimony against him, and had an
execution issued in her favor for both temporary and permanent alimony. The beneficiary, plaintiff, seeks to enjoin the sheriff from selling
or attempting to sell any of his property. Held, the chancellor may
under the will as well as under his general control of trust estates,
take jurisdiction of the matter and direct the trustee what to do, unless
he is invested with an absolute discretion. Ford v. Ford, 18 S. W.
(2nd) 859.
When the powers of the trustee are discretionary, equity will not
intervene unless the trustee acts in bad faith, or in abuse of his powers,
Woodard v. Dain et al. (Me. 1913), 85 Atl. 660; Baer v. Kahn (Md.
1917), 101 Atl. 596, or unreasoiiably. Viall v. R1hode Island Hos'pital
Trust Co., 123 Atl. 570.
But in the principal case there was interference by the court and
no bad faith or unreasonableness on the part of the trustee was shown.
However, here the court seemed to intimate it would not have done so
had the trustee been invested with an "absolute discretion." In Keyser
v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. 473, there is also an indication, a negative inference,
however, of such a rule. So, while the idea is not entirely new, it
would seem the limitations on a trustee are added to by the principal
case and the last mentioned case, so that equity will not interfere if
the trustee acts in good faith, acts reasonably, and has an absolute
discretion.
Altho this is a limitation upon the powers of a discretionary trustee, it is submitted that this is a good addition to the rule. It gives
opportunity to the testator to state more carefully the extent of the
power he wishes the trustee to exercise, but at the same time broadens
the testator's power. There are many things that a trustee might do
that a court of equity would say were done by the trustee in good faith
and were reasonable, but which, had the court been exercising its dis-
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cretion in the place of the trustee, it would not have done itself. The
court could conceivably say, "we think the trustee is acting in good
faith and fs acting reasonably, but in our judgment is pursuing a wrong
policy for the best interests of the beneficiary," if it had such power.
But if the testator gives "absolute. discretion" to the trustee, as the
testator should have the power to do where he has great faith in the
judgment of a certain trustee, the trustee's discretion could be controlled only when he acted in bad faith or unreasonably. If a testator
wanted su6h power given he could so state, but if 'he wanted more
court supervision over the trustee he could omit it, hence the testator's
testamentaty power is broadened.
M. P. W.
ThUSTs-T
ln TI0o BY CONSENT OF PARTIMS.-R left a will dividing his property in four shares and leaving one share each to his three
children and one to the children of a deceased child. One of the children died leaving a will whereby all of his property (personalty) left
by R was given to his widow. The other children and the guardian
of the minor grandchildren threatened to contest the latter will. A
compromise was effected creating a trust. The widow, the cestui que
trust, was to get the dividends from the personalty for her life and on
her death the corpus of the estate was to go to the other children and
minor grandchildren. Later by consent of all of the parties the trust
was terminated. Held, the agreement to terminate was valid and
proper. Reidlin's @uardian v. Cobb, 222 Ky. 654, 1 (2nd) S. W. 1071.
It has long been recognized In Kentucky that the power of revocation is not a necessary incident of a voluntary settlement for the
benefit of the settlor for life and such power will not be implied from
the absence of an express provision against revocation. Krankel's
Rxe'r v. Krankel, 104 Ky. 745; Anderson v. Kemper, 116 Ky. 339, 76
S. W. 122. It is a well recognized rule that "where all the parties
interested in a trust fund are sui juris they may consent to a termination of the trust and a distribution of the fund." Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, 104 N. E. 659; In re Harrar's Estate, 244 Pa. 542,
91 A. 503. The trust estate must not be subject to any future contingencies and the purposes for which the trust was created must have
been substantially fulfilled. Broumin v. Filkin, 26 Ky. L. R. 470, 12
S. W. 714; Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N. E. 1064; Brown v.
Owsley, 198 Ky. 344, 248 S. W. 889; Miller's Exe'rs v. Miller's Heirs,
172 Ky. 519, 189 S. W. 417; Wood v. Gridley, 217 Ill. App. 579. It is
necessary that the beneficiaries be sui juris before they can consent to
a termination of the trust. At first blush it would seem that the
Instant case Is wrong. However, the minor grandchildren have a
regularly appointed guardian through whom they can consent. The
power to consent to the termination of trusts by guardians is to be
inferred from Kentucky Statutes, sections 2031, 2032, and 2039. These
sections give them the power to sell personalty and to lease real estate
but not for a longer term than seven years. Guardians in the manage-

CASE COM=TS
ment of the 'ward's estate must act with the same good faith and
discretion that an ordinarily prudent man would exercise in the management of his own affairs. Layne v. Clark, 152 Ky. 310, 153 S. W. 437;
In re Wood's Estate & Guardianship, 159 Cal. 466, 114 P. 992'; In re
Stude's Estate, 179 Iowa 785, 162 N. W. 10; Simes v. Ward, 103 A.
(N. H.) 310. The trust res in the case at bar was personalty and, since
the guardian has the right to control the personalty and the cancellation of the trust was to the ward's interest, no objection can be urged
against the instant case.
The desire of the beneficiaries alone is not sufficient to cause a
termination. The caprice and whim of one only of the interested parties should not prevail. The consent of the trustee and the beneficiaries
is not enough. The law recognizes as interested parties the settlor
and the cestuis. The consent of the trustee is not necessary., Fidelity
Columbia Trust Co., Trustee v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S. W. 537;
Eakie v. Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 75 P. 566. The fact that a trust is to run
for the life of the cestui will not prevent the termination by consent
of all those interested which includes the cestui.
The doctrine of the instant case has no application to a case where
there is a reservation of the power to revoke in the settlor. Termination can in such a case be had only in the manner prescribed.
W. C. W.
TJtJRY-AMETHODS OF AvoiDING STAkTrUT.-In order to procure a loan,
the borrower contracted to pay six per cent interest on the same plus
certain other expenses which the lender had to incur to secure the
loan. The certain other expenses contracted to be paid for included an
attorney's fee for examining the title of the land offered as security
for the loan, the cost of the appraisal of the property and survey, fire
and tornado insurance premiums, the cost of guaranties and compensation for services incidental to the loan. Held, the agreement not
usurious even though the borrowet agreed to pay the lender a sum
greater than the legal rate of interest. Ashland National Bank v.
Conley, 231 Ky. 844, 22 S. W. (2nd) 270.
The court starts out with the rule of law that "where the borrower
agrees to pay the lender a sum greater than the legal rate of interest,
if the consideration for this agreement is the use of the money loaned,
it constitutes usury." The court seems to evade this rule, however,.by
stating that where the consideration is for services or expenses incidental to the procuring of the loan, it is not usury and such agreement
will be enforced. Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Edwards,
219 Ky. 748, 294 S. W. 502; Webb v. Southern Trust Company, 227 Ky.
70, 11 S. W. (2nd) 988. In Lassnn v. Jacobson, 125 Minn. 218, 51
L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, 146 N. W. 350, the rule is stated thus: "Expenses
incident to making the loan and furnishing the lender satisfactory
security for its repayment can in no sense be considered compensation
for the use of the money loaned."
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According to the great weight of authority the payment by the
borrower of all reasonable expenses incident to the loan and reasonable compensation for services necessitated by such loan, is not usury
even though this make the cost of the transaction to the borrower
exceed the maximum legal rate. Iowa Savings and L. Ass'n v. Heidt,
107 Iowa 297, 43 L. R. A. 689, 70 Am. St. Rep. 197; Southern Bank for
Brashears, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 578; Brown v. Robinson, 224 N. Y.
301, 120 N. E. 694; Shattuck v. Byford, 62 Ark. 431, 35 S. W. 1107; Hatthews v. Georgia State Savings Ass'n, 132 Ark. 219, 200 S. W. 130, 21
A. L. R. 789; Atlanta Min.d Rolling Mill Company v. G-wyer, 43 Ga. 9.
The services actually rendered the borrower or the expenses incurred
in securing the loan must be in good faith and not as a cloak to conceal usury. Excessive interest cannot be hidden under pretended
charges for expense of drawing papers, examining security, and the
like. Sanders v. Nicolson, 101 Ga. 739, 28 S. E. 976; First National
Bank v. Phares, 174 P. 519; Kidwell v. White, 44 App. D. C. 600; Horgan
v. Nesbitt, 58 Minn. 487.
An occasional case may be found where the strict rule was followed and a different result reached. Jackson v.May, 28 Ill. App. 305;
Hine v. Handy, 1 Johns. Ch. 6.
It is submitted that while the rule of the instant case may prove
good public policy in that it makes loans more easy to negotiate, yet
it is a question as to whether this doctrine is not a serious inroad on
the law of usury, affording to the loan shark an indirect means of exacting an excessive rate of interest in direct contravention to the statute.
The rule of the principal case represents the great weight and trend
of modern authority.
E. E. A.
WiLms-REQuEsT.-The testator bequeathed to his wife his estate
"to be used for her comfort and for the education of his granddaughter." In a subsequent clause of his will he labelled these words
"a request." Held, not a mere request, but the creation of a binding
trust. Ogilive et al. v. Bryant et al., 21 S. W. (2nd) 433 (Ky.).
The problem raised is whether the use of the word "request" shall
supplant the imperative words used by the testator in the preceding
paragraph so as to make it read: "I request that you use this property
for your own comfort and in educating my granddaughter," or shall
the previous paragraph be held to be the clear expression of the testator's intention and to be of such an imperative, directing and commanding nature as to explain away the non-imperative word "request?"
If the former-then we have the problem of "precatory words."
The word "request" does not naturally Impart an obligation.
However, the early view was that the use of the word was a soft and
courteous means of creating duties enforceable by the courts. Malin
v. Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 333; Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. 148. Since the
beginning of the nineteenth century the English courts have held that
the natural significance of precatory words is not a trust, but that such
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an obligation may be shown by the other portion of the instrument.
Hill v. Hill (1897) 1 Q. B. 483, at 486. See Bogert on Trusts, p. 47-51.
The American Courts have adopted this natural construction of precatory expressions. In re Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. 268; 59 Am. Dec. 718;
Hughes v. Fitzgerald,78 Conn. 4, 60 Atl. 694; McAndy v. McGaZum, 186
Mass. 644, 72 N. E. 75. Thus the modern rule in U. S. and Eng. in
order that a trust may arise from the use of precatory words is that
the court must be satisfied from the words themselves, taken in connection with all the other terms of the disposition, that the testator's
intention to create an express trust was as full, complete, settled and
sure as though he had given the property to hold upon a trust declared
in the ordinary manner. Pom. Eq. Jur., sec. 1016; Eaton Equity, 369.
The Kentucky courts have uniformily held that the use of the
words "I request" or the equivalent are insufficient to raise or create
a precatory trust. White et al. v. Irvine, 74 S. W. 247 (1903); Igo v.
Irvine, 70 S. W. 836 (1902); Goslee's Adm'r v. Goslee's Exr., 94 S. W.
638 (1906); Thursto.'s Ad 'r et al. v. Prather, 77 S. W. 354 (1903);
Wood et al. v. Wood et al., 106 S. W. 226 (1907); Hinton v. Hinton et
al., 176 S. W. 947 (1915); Grosd et al. v. Smart et al., 224 S. W. 871
(1920).
The only ground on which precatory words can ever be construed
to create a trust is that the testator intended them to be mandatory
upon the devisee or legatee, that he used the words to express something different from their natural and ordinary meaning. See Perry
on Trusts (7th edition), vol. 1, sec. 112, and following: Gardner on
Wills at page 478.
The peculiar situation involved in the instant case gave the court
the opportunity to dodge the issue as to wheth'r or not there was a
precatory trust formed by the delayed or subsequent use of the word
"request" in the will, and in its stead to set up the fundamental rule
that the intention of the testator prevails at all times--that the testator's Intention here was to create an absolute trust in his wife and
not a mere request that she create the trust. If the court had decided
this case squarely upon the precatory trust issue then the result would
have been different as shown by the foregoing cases and authorities.
The court, however, reached a just result in this case, as it was
obviously the testator's intention that a trust be formed for the benefit
of his granddaughter.
W. B. G.

